J. Rogers, SE Ohio
A case for the Judicial Impartiality and Clemency Integrity Amendment
Two institutions that were meant to be the last word in American government now share the same problem: nobody can check them, and the public has noticed. The Supreme Court and the presidential pardon both operate with almost no outside review. Over the last few years, that gap has produced scandals, suspicion, and a steady loss of trust on both sides of the aisle.
This post lays out what has gone wrong, why both parties have contributed to it, and how a narrow constitutional amendment would address it without handing anyone a new weapon.
The Court's reputation problem
In July 2026, Gallup reported that only 33 percent of Americans approved of how the Supreme Court is doing its job, the lowest reading in the poll's 26-year history. Its September reading was 34 percent approve and 61 percent disapprove. Marquette Law School's September poll put approval at 43 percent, its second-lowest reading since January 2025.
The detail that matters most is who is unhappy. Gallup found Republican approval fell 21 points, to 58 percent, after rulings against the Trump administration on tariffs and birthright citizenship. Earlier Marquette polling showed a majority of Americans believing the Court favored the president. So the Court is now being distrusted by the left for appearing to side with the administration and by parts of the right for ruling against it. When both camps conclude the Court is acting politically, the problem is no longer about any one ruling.
Marquette also found that people supported the Court's decisions in 11 of 13 major cases it asked about, even while disapproving of the institution. Americans are not rejecting the outcomes so much as the process and the people behind them.
An ethics code that nobody can enforce
In 2023, after reporting on undisclosed gifts and luxury travel provided to Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito by wealthy donors, the Court adopted its first code of conduct. Critics across the legal world pointed out what it lacked: no enforcement mechanism, advisory language instead of mandatory rules, and commentary stating that each Justice, not the Court, decides his or her own recusal. Justice Alito has said publicly that Congress has no power to impose a binding code on the Court.
Meanwhile, every other federal judge is bound by a code and subject to a complaint process. The Justices are the only federal officials who can be the sole judge of whether their own conflict of interest requires them to step aside. That is a structure any lawyer would tell a client to avoid.
The weaponization charge cuts both ways
Each side now believes the other has turned the Court into a political instrument. Critics of the current Court point to its record on the emergency docket, where one advocacy tally says it sided with the Trump administration more than 80 percent of the time in the second term. Supporters point out that the same Court has just handed the administration high-profile losses, and that complaints about legitimacy tend to follow whichever side loses.
The amendment does not need to settle who is right. It addresses the thing both sides can see: the stakes of each appointment are too high, because a seat can last thirty years or more, and that makes every vacancy a political emergency. Eighteen-year staggered terms, with one vacancy every two years, give each president the same number of appointments and make any single seat less decisive.
Pardons: both parties, same problem
The pardon power is the other unchecked institution, and neither party has handled it well.
President Biden pardoned his son Hunter in December 2024 after months of saying he would not, covering offenses back to 2014. In his final hours, he issued preemptive pardons to five family members, and also to figures such as Anthony Fauci and Gen. Mark Milley. Democrats including Rep. Jason Crow, Sen. Richard Blumenthal and Rep. Jared Moskowitz criticized the moves as a mistake or an expansion of the power too far.
President Trump has pardoned roughly 1,500 people charged in connection with January 6, along with a long list of allies and donors. Reports from CBS News describe brokers charging fees as high as $3 million to pursue clemency, and a New York Times analysis found he has granted clemency to more than 70 allies, donors and others in fraud cases across his two terms. Democrats have opened inquiries asking whether donors received pardons in return for contributions. His defenders say many of these cases involved prosecutions they view as politically motivated; the White House has not conceded a pattern of pay-for-play.
What unites these cases is not their politics. It is that the person holding the power benefited, or appeared to benefit, from how it was used. Even a Democratic congressman in line for a key House investigative role has called Biden's pardons a mistake while Trump openly weighs preemptive clemency for his own circle. Each side's precedent becomes the other side's license.
What the amendment does
The amendment is deliberately narrow. It does not punish anyone, remove anyone, or touch the executive, military or legislative powers. It does five things.
1. One ethics standard for everyone. All judges and Justices are bound by identical rules on gifts, financial disclosure and recusal, and no judge can be the sole arbiter of his or her own impartiality. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges, as of ratification, is a floor Congress can raise but never lower.
2. An objective appearance test. An act is subject to invalidation if it was performed under circumstances creating a reasonable appearance of corruption, self-dealing or personal conflict involving the actor, their family, their business associates or their co-conspirators. Guilt and intent do not matter. This is the same appearance standard already used in judicial recusal law, applied to the Court and to the pardon.
3. A neutral reviewer. A Judicial Ethics Tribunal drawn from the 100 longest-serving active lower-court judges, hearing cases in random 15-judge panels. Those judges were appointed by presidents of both parties across decades, and no one can pick the panel. Voiding a Supreme Court act requires two-thirds of the panel.
4. A single remedy. The Tribunal can only declare the conflicted act void and require recusal. No fines, no removal, no criminal penalty. A voided Supreme Court decision is retried from the earliest tainted stage, with a full nine-member bench. A voided pardon restores the prior legal status, and the same President cannot re-issue it.
5. Clean pardon rules. A self-pardon is conclusively presumed to be a conflict. Any pardon of the President, the Vice President, or their family, business associates or co-conspirators is reviewed automatically. Challenges to pardons have no outer time limit, since concealed deals surface slowly.
Under this text, Biden's pardons of his own family and Trump's pardons of his own circle would be reviewed by the same panel under the same test. That symmetry is the point.
What it does not do
It applies only to acts after ratification, so it would not reopen any pardon or ruling that exists today. It does not reach a categorical pardon of political supporters unless a specific conflict can be shown. And a donor who paid for access to a pardon may or may not fit the definition of a business associate, which is why the broader reasonable-appearance test in Section 3 matters.
The objections, stated fairly
Supporters of the existing system will raise serious points.
The pardon power in Article II is broad and, as written, has no review. Some scholars will argue that the amendment is the right way to limit it; others will argue that any limit invites the very political fights the founders tried to avoid. Lower-court judges reviewing the Supreme Court inverts the usual hierarchy, even if the review is limited to conflicts. "Appearance" is a flexible standard, and a petition by ten members of Congress could be used as a partisan tool, even with random panels and a high threshold. And any amendment needs two-thirds of both chambers and three-fourths of the states, a bar that is high precisely when the two sides trust each other least.
Those are real costs. The case for the amendment is that the current alternative is a Court that polices itself, a pardon power that polices no one, and a public that increasingly believes both are for sale or for partisans.
The bottom line
The Court and the pardon were each designed on the assumption that the people holding them would police themselves. That assumption has failed under presidents and Justices of both parties. This amendment does not ask anyone to trust a new institution with new power. It asks for a narrow, neutral check on the two places where the system currently has none.
Sources drawn on: Gallup (July and September 2026 Supreme Court approval); Marquette Law School polls (May, July and September 2026); Washington Times and Newsweek coverage of the Gallup and Biden pardon stories; Brennan Center; Center for American Progress; ProPublica and CBS News reporting as summarized by secondary outlets; New York Times analysis of fraud clemency as summarized by Political Wire; Forbes; The Hill; Reuters. Figures should be rechecked against the original reports before publication.
No comments:
Post a Comment